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Introduction

One of the key tenets of Marxian economics is the idea that exploitation and
class are defining features of capitalist economies. This raises two issues.
First, the existence of a logically coherent and empirically meaningful definition of exploitation and class. Second, the economic mechanisms that lead
to the emergence and persistence of exploitation and class.
The first issue has received a lot of attention in the literature, leading to
vast debates on the notions of exploitation and class. The received view is
that no logically consistent and empirically meaningful definition exists which
captures the key positive and normative insights of the Marxian theory of exploitation and class in general economies. This view has been questioned in a
series of recent papers by Yoshihara and Veneziani (e.g. [26, 27, 19]). In these
contributions, the concept of exploitation is analysed using a novel, general
axiomatic approach which allows one to rigorously capture the normative
and positive foundations of exploitation theory. Contrary to the received
wisdom, it is shown that there exists a nonempty class of logically consistent definitions - conceptually related to the so-called “New Interpretation”
(Duménil [5]; Foley [8]; Duménil, Foley, and Lévy [6]; see also Mohun [11])
- that satisfy a set of desirable properties in general convex economies with
heterogeneous agents - including the existence of a robust relation between
profits and exploitation, as well as between class and exploitation.
These contributions, however, focus on one-period economies with no
savings and accumulation, and have relatively little to say about the second
issue in the opening paragraph, namely the dynamics of class, exploitation,
and profits. This is not a minor issue. In his seminal theory, Roemer [14] has
proved that exploitation and classes emerge as the equilibrium outcome of
differential ownership of the means of production in competitive economies
with optimising agents when capital is scarce, leading him to conclude that
the normative relevance of exploitation reduces to an exclusive emphasis on
asset inequalities.
Yet Roemer’s results have been derived in one-period models whereas capitalism, according to Marx, is an inherently dynamic system geared towards
capital accumulation and so one may argue that class and exploitation should
be analysed in a dynamic framework. In dynamic accumulation economies,
it is not difficult to show that capital may become abundant, leading profits
and exploitation to disappear (Devine and Dymski [4]). Perhaps more surprisingly, Veneziani [17, 18] and Veneziani and Yoshihara [20] have proved
that if savings are allowed in a dynamic capitalist economy, then asset inequalities are necessary for exploitation to emerge, but alone they are not
2

sufficient for it to persist even if agents do not accumulate in equilibrium.
These results cast doubts on the claim that asset inequalities are necessary
and sufficient for the emergence and the persistence of exploitative relations,
and raise the issue of the determinants of exploitation and class.
This paper adopts the conceptual approach to exploitation proposed by
Yoshihara and Veneziani ([26, 27, 19]) in order to study the dynamics of
asset inequalities, exploitation and classes. We significantly generalise Roemer’s [13, 14] accumulation economies with maximising agents in order to
incorporate nonstationary prices, population growth, time-varying consumption norms, technical change, and distributive conflict. We analyse - both
formally and computationally - the dynamic equilibrium trajectories of the
economies and their class and exploitation structures, and generalise some
fundamental insights originally proved by Roemer [14], including the so-called
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (henceforth, CECP).
To be specific, we consider three main models exploring different mechanisms determining the emergence and persistence of exploitation and class.
We start off by analysing a basic economy with constant consumption, population, and technology: this benchmark scenario confirms the insights of
the previous literature by showing that accumulation leads exploitation to
disappear because the economy eventually becomes labour constrained.
We then extend the model to consider capitalists’ decisions to innovate
and norm-based consumption dynamics. Empirically, the long-run evolution
of capitalist economies has indeed been characterised by an increase in (average) consumption opportunities and by a tendential expansion of technical
knowledge, leading to a progressive increase in labour productivity (Flaschel
et al. [7]). Theoretically, our analysis confirms that labour-saving technical
progress may play a crucial role in making exploitation persistent by guaranteeing the persistent abundance of labour (Skillman [15]). In other words,
the capitalists’ control of investment and innovation decisions can make exploitation persistent by maintaining labour unemployment over time.
Although many actual capitalist economies have indeed gone through
long spells of labour unemployment, one may argue with Roemer [14] that
a general theory of exploitation and classes should not crucially depend either positively or normatively - on structural imbalances in factor markets.
Exploitation and class are characteristics of capitalist relations of production
and full employment does not make capitalist economies non-exploitative.
Therefore we analyse an extension of the basic model with population growth,
technical change and accumulation in which full employment occurs in every
period and distribution is determined using a general Nash bargaining procedure with the bargaining power of each agent endogenously determined as
3

a function of their ownership of the means of production and class solidarity.
The results are quite striking: technical change and population growth are
not sufficient to make exploitation persistent unless capitalists are sufficiently
powerful and class solidarity among propertyless workers is sufficiently weak
even if the economy never becomes labour constrained. Capitalist power is an
essential determinant of the persistence of exploitation and class.
In all economies, we analyse the evolution of the structure of exploitative relations. By deriving a robust correspondence between class and exploitation status, the CECP yields relevant normative insights on capitalist
economies. Yet, the CECP draws a rather partial, coarse picture of the
structure of exploitative relations: two economies with similar numbers of
agents belonging to each class and each exploitation category may still be
very different. Based on [26, 27, 19], we propose a novel index of the level,
or intensity of exploitation for individual agents, whose distribution provides
a finer and more comprehensive picture of exploitative relations. The analysis of its distribution yields relevant normative insights, and it raises some
interesting issues that are conceptually analogous to those discussed in the
literature on the measurement of income inequality.
Another contribution of the paper is methodological. Given the complexity of the economies considered, the paper adopts a novel computational
approach to Marxian exploitation theory. Pioneering work applying computational methods to Marxian theory includes Wright [23, 24, 25], Cogliano
[2], and Cogliano and Jiang [3]. But the latter contributions focus on Marxian price and value theory and the circuit of capital rather than exploitation
and class. More related to our work is an unpublished paper by Takamasu
[16], which adopts a computational approach to study class formation in accumulation economies. Yet this paper does not analyse exploitation and it
only considers a very basic scenario with constant technology, population and
consumption. Moreover, there is no explicit analysis of agents’ maximising
decisions or of the equilibrium conditions.
By moving beyond the straightjacket of analytical solutions, a computational approach allows us to study the equilibrium determination of exploitation status and the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle, and trace
the co-evolution of exploitation and class over time in complex economies
with endogenous technical change, population growth, norm–based consumption dynamics, and generalised N -agent bargaining. The results obtained are
robust with respect to changes in the specification of technology, population,
preferences and, especially, endowments, but also to alternative specifications
of some of the behavioural assumptions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The general framework
4

is described in section 2. Section 3 analyses the benchmark economy with
stationary technology, population and consumption. Section 4 derives some
key theoretical results concerning class and exploitation in the basic model.
Section 5 presents the index capturing the level of exploitation of each agent.
Section 6 analyses the dynamics of the basic model, and its exploitation
and class structures, using computational techniques. Section 7 extends the
analysis to economies with endogenous consumption and technical change,
whereas section 8 focuses on the role of bargaining and power in economies
with full employment, technical change and population growth. Section 9
discusses the robustness of the results. Section 10 concludes.

2

The framework

Consider a dynamic extension of Roemer’s [14] accumulating economy with a
labour market and only one good produced and consumed.1 In every period
t = 1, 2, . . ., let Nt denote the set of agents with cardinality Nt and generic
element ν. At the beginning of each production period t, there is a finite set,
Pt , of Leontief production techniques (At , Lt ), where 0 < At < 1 and Lt > 0,
and all agents have access to the techniques in Pt .
In every period t, agents have identical preferences but possess potentially
ν
ν
, inherited from previ, and capital, ωt−1
different endowments of labour, lt−1
ous periods. The
distribution
of
endowments
at
the
beginning
of t is given


ν
N
ν
N
by Πt−1 = lt−1 ν ∈Nt ∈ R++ and Ωt−1 = ωt−1 ν ∈Nt ∈ R+ . In every t, each

ν
ν
, ωt−1
∈ R2+ .
agent ν ∈ Nt is therefore completely identified
by a duplet lt−1

ν
ν
An agent ν ∈ Nt endowed with lt−1
, ωt−1
can engage in three types of production activity: she can sell her labour power ztν ; she can hire others to
operate a technique (At , Lt ) ∈ Pt at the level ytν ; or she can work on her own
to operate (At , Lt ) ∈ Pt at the level xνt .
Following Roemer [13, 14], we assume that production takes time and
current choices are constrained by past events. To be precise, wages are paid
ex post and wt ∈ R+ denotes the nominal wage rate at the end of t, but every
agent must be able to lay out in advance the operating costs for the activities
ν
she chooses to operate using her wealth Wt−1
. Letting pt ∈ R+ denote the
price of the produced commodity at the end of t and beginning of t + 1, the
ν
ν
market value of agent ν’s endowment - her wealth - is Wt−1
= pt−1 ωt−1
. The
1
Given our focus on the dynamics of exploitation and class, the one-good assumption
yields no loss of generality. The model can be extended to include n commodities, albeit
at the cost of a significant increase in technicalities and computational intensity.
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wealth that is not used for production activities can be invested to purchase
goods to sell at the end of the period, δtν .
Our main behavioural assumption postulates that agents wish to accumulate as much as possible, subject to consuming bt ∈ R++ per unit of
labour performed, Λνt ≡ Lxνt + ztν . Within every period t, we consider bt
as a constant parameter, but we do allow for the possibility that bt changes
endogenously over time.
This modelling choice is motivated by our focus on the dynamics of exploitation and class in capitalist economies characterised by a drive to accumulate, rather than on consumer choices. Theoretically, it is also consistent
with the classical-Marxian tradition where consumption is largely the product of social norms, rather than utility-maximising behaviour, and it allows
us to analyse the issue of the persistence of class and exploitation abstracting from heterogeneous individual consumption behaviour. Unlike in many
accumulation models in the Marxian tradition, however, the introduction
of an (endogenously determined) subsistence bundle raises some interesting
theoretical and technical issues, as it imposes a relevant and oft-neglected
constraint on the set of equilibria.

3

The basic model

In this section, we set up and analyse the basic model, which is characterised
by constant population, technology, preferences, consumption norms, and
labour endowments over time. The focus on the basic model is motivated by
analytical clarity and because it provides a theoretical benchmark and starting point for our analysis. However, the framework, concepts, and definitions
presented in this section, and in the next one, can be easily extended and
the results derived continue to hold in more general economies (as confirmed
also by the simulations).

ν
Let Nt = N , Pt = P = {(A, L)}, bt = b, and lt−1
= (lν )ν ∈N for
ν ∈N
all t, and suppose that the economy is sufficiently productive to produce a
surplus: 1 − vb > 0, where v = L(1 − A)−1 denotes the embodied labour
value.2 In every t, given (pt , wt ), every agent ν ∈ N chooses xνt , ytν , ztν ,
and δtν to maximise her wealth subject to purchasing b per unit of labour
performed (1) and to the constraints set by her capital (2) and labour (3)
2

The condition 1 − vb > 0 is equivalent to (1 − bL) > A: it implies that if Ax units
of capital are invested in the production process, (1 − bL) x > Ax units of output (net of
necessary consumption) are produced.

6

endowments. Formally, every ν solves the following programme M Ptν :
max

pt ωtν

(xνt ; ytν ; ztν ;δtν )

subject to
pt xνt + [pt − wt L] ytν + wt ztν + pt δtν
pt−1 Axνt + pt−1 Aytν + pt−1 δtν
Lxνt + ztν
xνt , ytν , ztν , δtν , ωtν

=
=
5
=

pt bΛνt + pt ωtν
ν
,
pt−1 ωt−1
ν
l ,
0.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

ν
ν
ν
ν
ν
Let Aν (pt , wt ) be the set of actions ξtν ≡ (x
t ; yt ; zt ; δt ) that solve M Pt

ν
; (pt , wt ) ≡ max pt ωtν be the value of
at prices (pt , wt ). Let Vtν pt−1 ωt−1
ν
ν
M Pt realised by the actions in A (pt , wt ). Let (p, w) ≡ {(pt , wt )}t=1,... and
let (xν ; y ν ; z ν ; δ ν ) ≡ ξ ν = {ξtν }t=1,... . A basic accumulation economy is
defined by the set of agents, N , technology, (A, L), consumption bundle, b,
labour endowments, Π, and initial capital endowments, Ω0 ; and is denoted
as
P
E(N ; (A, L) ; b; Π, Ω0 ), or, as a shorthand notation, E0 . Let xt ≡ ν ∈N xνt ,
and likewise for yt , zt , δt , ωt , Λt , and l. Based on Roemer [14], the equilibrium
notion can be defined.

Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(N ; (A, L) ; b; Π, Ω0 ) is a
vector (p, w) and associated actions (ξ ν )ν∈N , such that at all t:
(a) ξtν ∈ Aν (pt , wt ), for all ν ∈ N (individual optimality);
(b) A(xt + yt ) + δt 5 ωt−1 (capital market);
(c) Lyt = zt (labour market);
(d) (xt + yt ) + δt = bΛt + ωt (goods market).
At a RS, in every period (a) all agents optimise; (b) aggregate capital is
sufficient for production plans; (c) the labour market clears; (d) aggregate
supply is sufficient for consumption and accumulation plans. The economy
E(N ; (A, L) ; b; Π, Ω0 ) can thus be interpreted either as a sequence of generations living for one period or as an infinitely-lived economy analysed in a
sequence of temporary equilibria.
A−wt L
. Given the strucFor any (p, w), the profit rate at t is πt = pt −ppt−1
t−1 A
ture of the economy, we shall focus on equilibria with strictly positive prices.3
It immediately follows from M Ptν that if there is some t0 such that pt0 = 0, then at
any RS it must be pt = 0 for all t > t0 .
3
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Hence the profit rate is well defined at all t, and we can take the produced
commodity as the numéraire, setting pt = 1, all t. Let the normalised price
vector be denoted as (1, w),
b where 1 = (1, 1, ...) and, at any t, w
bt is the real
wage rate. It is immediate to prove that at any RS, if ωt−1 > 0, then w
bt = b
and πt = 0, all t.
Given the previous observations, by constraints (1)-(2), it follows that at
any RS, for all ν ∈ N and all t, the following equation must hold
ν
.
bt − b) (Lxνt + ztν ) + ωt−1
bt L] (xνt + ytν ) + (w
ωtν = [1 − A − w

(5)

Equation (5) has a number of implications. Lemma 1 proves that if the
profit rate is strictly positive, then all wealth is used productively and if the
wage rate is above subsistence, then the labour constraint (3) binds, for all
agents at the solution to M Ptν .4
Lemma 1: Let (1, w)
b be a RS for E0 . At any t: if πt > 0, then A (xνt + ytν ) =
ν
, all ν ∈ N ; and if w
bt > b, then Lxνt + ztν = lν , all ν ∈ N .
ωt−1
ν
Proof: By equation (5), if πt > 0, but A (xνt + ytν ) < ωt−1
, some ν ∈ N ,
ν
then ν can increase yt and capital accumulation, contradicting optimality.
Similarly, if w
bt > b and Lxνt + ztν < lν , ν ∈ N , then ν can increase ztν and
capital accumulation, contradicting optimality.

Next, it is possible to derive an explicit expression for the value of M Ptν
and for the growth rate of capital, gtν , for all agents.

ν
ν
+
; (1, w
bt ) = (1 + πt ) ωt−1
Lemma 2: Let (1, w)
b be a RS for E0 . Then Vtν ωt−1
lν
ν
ν
(w
bt − b) l , and gt = πt + (w
bt − b) ων , for all ν ∈ N .
t−1

Proof: Straightforward from equation (5).
Lemma 2 has some interesting implications concerning the dynamics of
accumulation. Let π max ≡ 1−A−bL
. Firstly, at all t, the aggregate growth
A
l
rate of the economy is gt = πt + (w
bt − b) ωt−1
. Hence, if l = LA−1 ωt−1 , then
gt = π max , and if w
bt = b, then gtν = gt = π max , for all ν ∈ N such that
ν
ωt−1
> 0. Secondly, if w
bt > b, then for any ν, µ ∈ N , gtν > gtµ if and only
µ
ν
lν
, for all ν ∈ N such
if ωlν > ωlµ . Finally, if πt = 0 then gtν = (1−vb)
v
ων
t−1

t−1

t−1

ν
that ωt−1
> 0, and gt =

(1−vb) l
.
v
ωt−1

Therefore, if there exists t0 = 1 such that


To be precise, a RS should be denoted as (1, w)
b , (xν ; y ν ; z ν ; δ ν )ν∈N . In what
follows, we simply write (1, w)
b for the sake of notational simplicity.
4
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πt = 0 for all t = t0 , then the growth rate of the basic economy decreases
over time and tends asymptotically to zero.
Lemma 3 derives a useful property of the set of solutions of M Ptν .
Lemma 3: Let (1, w)
b be a given price vector such that πt = 0 and w
bt =
ν
ν
0ν
4
ν
b, some t. If ξt solves M Pt , then ξt ∈ R+ also solves M Pt whenever
0ν
ν
ν
0ν
0ν
ν
ν
x0ν
t + yt = xt + yt and zt − Lyt = zt − Lyt .
Proof: It is easy to check that ξt0ν satisfies constraints (1)-(2). Moreover,
0ν
0ν
0ν
labour performed is the same in ξtν and ξt0ν , since L (x0ν
t + yt )+(zt − Lyt ) =
L (xνt + ytν ) + (ztν − Lytν ). Then the result follows from equation (5).
Lemma 3 implies that if (xνt ; ytν ; ztν ; δtν ) solves M Ptν , then there is another vector (0; yt0ν ; zt0ν ; δtν ) which solves M Ptν . In the simulations, this
allows us to select one of the many potential solutions of M Ptν by setting
xνt = 0 for all ν ∈ N .
Theorem 1 characterises the equilibria of the economy.

Theorem 1: Let (1, w)
b , (ξ ν )ν∈N be a RS for E0 . At any t:
(i) If πt > 0 and w
bt > b, then l = LA−1 ωt−1 . Furthermore, for any (1, w
bt0 )
such that πt0 = 0 and w
bt0 = b, (ξtν )ν∈N also satisfies conditions (a)-(d) of
Definition 1;
(ii) If l > LA−1 ωt−1 > 0 then w
bt = b;
−1
(iii) If l < LA ωt−1 then πt = 0.
ν
and Lxνt + ztν = lν , for all
Proof: Part (i). By Lemma 1, A (xνt + ytν ) = ωt−1
ν ∈ N . Therefore, A (xt + yt ) = ωt−1 and, by Definition 1(c), L (xt + yt ) =
Lxt + zt = l. Since (xt + yt ) = A−1 ωt−1 , we have L (xt + yt ) = LA−1 ωt−1 = l.
To prove the second part of the statement, take any (1, w
bt0 ) such that πt0 = 0
bt0 ) for
and w
bt0 = b. Then, it is immediate to show that ξtν solves M Ptν at (1, w
ν
all ν and (ξt )ν∈N satisfies conditions (b)-(d) of Definition 1 by assumption.
Part (ii). At any RS, it must be w
bt = b. Suppose, contrary to the
ν
statement, that w
bt > b. Then, for all ν ∈ N , by (2), A (xνt + ytν ) 5 ωt−1
ν
ν
ν
−1
and by Lemma 1, Lxt + zt = l . But, since l > LA ωt−1 , Lyt < zt holds,
contradicting Definition 1(c). Therefore w
bt = b.
Part (iii). At any RS, it must be πt = 0. Suppose, contrary to the
statement, that πt > 0. Then, for all ν ∈ N , by (3), Lxνt + ztν 5 lν and
ν
by Lemma 1, A (xνt + ytν ) = ωt−1
. But, since l < LA−1 ωt−1 , Lyt > zt holds,
contradicting Definition 1(c). Therefore πt = 0.

9

Theorem 1 defines the theoretical framework for the analysis of the dynamics of the economy and provides the foundations for the parameterisations of the price vector (1, w).
b Although it only identifies necessary conditions for the existence of a RS, it does shed some light on how to construct the
dynamic general equilibria of the economy. Consider part (ii) of the proof.
Suppose l > LA−1 ωt−1 , some t. If w
bt = b, then πt > 0 and labour performed
does not produce any net income for accumulation, and for all ν ∈ N , any
ν
solves M Ptν . Therefore since Ayt = ωt−1 and
(0; ytν ; ztν ; 0) with Aytν = ωt−1
l > LA−1 ωt−1 , we can choose a suitable profile (ztν )ν∈N such that Lyt = zt
and all conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied at t.
Consider part (iii) of the proof. Suppose l < LA−1 ωt−1 , some t. If πt = 0,
then w
bt > b and capital holders are indifferent between using their wealth
productively and just carrying it for sale at the end of the period, and for
all ν ∈ N , any (0; ytν ; ztν ; δtν ) with ztν = lν solves M Ptν . Therefore since
zt = l and l < LA−1 ωt−1 , we can choose a suitable profile (ytν )ν∈N such that
Lyt = zt and all conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied at t.

4

Exploitation and Class in the Accumulation Economy

The concept of exploitation in the accumulation economy can now be introduced. In what follows, exploitation status is defined in every period t: this is
a natural assumption if the model describes a series of one-period economies,
otherwise it reflects a focus on within period exploitation.5
Unlike in subsistence economies, focusing on the bundle consumed by an
agent may be misleading as both poor and rich agents consume b per unit of
labour expended, but their potential consumption is very different. Definition
2 identifies exploitation status in terms of the bundles of goods that an agent
can purchase with her income. More precisely,
for all ν ∈ N and all (pt , wt ),

ν
ν
ν
ν
ν
ν
let ct satisfy pt ct = Vt Wt−1 ; (pt , wt ) + pt bΛt − pt ωt−1
. Then
Definition 2 [Roemer [14]]: Agent ν is exploited at t if and only if Λνt > vcνt ;
she is an exploiter if and only if Λνt < vcνt ; and she is neither exploited nor
an exploiter if and only if Λνt = vcνt .
Theorem 2 characterises the exploitation νstatus of every agent, based on
W
their wealth per unit of labour performed Λt−1
ν :
t

5

For a discussion of within period and whole life exploitation, see Veneziani [17, 18].
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Theorem 2: Let (1, w)
b be a RS for E0 . At any t, if πt > 0:
Wν
(i) agent ν is an exploiter ⇔ Λt−1
> π1t [1−vwbt v] ;
ν
(ii) agent ν is exploited ⇔

ν
Wt−1
Λνt

t

<

bt v]
1 [1−w
;
πt
v

(iii) agent ν is neither exploited nor an exploiter ⇔

ν
Wt−1
Λνt

=

bt v]
1 [1−w
.
πt
v


ν
ν
+ (w
bt − b) lν , which
; (1, w
bt ) = (1 + πt ) Wt−1
Proof: By Lemma 2, Vtν Wt−1
ν
ν
ν
ν
in turn implies that ct = πt Wt−1 + (w
bt − b) l + bΛt , for all t and all ν ∈ N .
ν
Therefore for any w
bt = b, using Lemma 1, cνt = πt Wt−1
+w
bt Λνt , for all t andall
ν
ν ∈ N . But then agent ν is an exploiter if and only if v πt Wt−1
+w
bt Λνt >
Λνt , and the first part of the statement follows from simple algebraic manipulations. The other two parts follow in like manner.
Theorem 2 generalises analogous results by Roemer [14], as it characterises the exploitation status of all agents also in economies with unemployed labour. If w
bt > b, then Lemma 1 implies that Λνt = lν , all ν ∈ N ,
and so by Theorem 2 exploitation status is determined by the ratio of capital and labour endowments as in Roemer [14]. However, by Theorem 1, if
l > LA−1 ωt−1 , then w
bt = b holds and Definition 1(c) implies that Λνt < lν
for at least some ν ∈ N . In this case, the economy is characterised by unemployed labour, and exploitation status is νdetermined by the ratio of the
W
capital endowment and labour performed, Λt−1
ν .
t
Observe that Theorem 2 holds if πt > 0. If πt = 0 then w
bt = (1/v) > b
and Λνt = vcνt for all ν ∈ N and no exploitation exists in the economy.
This correspondence between profits and exploitation is a standard result in
Marxian theory (for a discussion, see Veneziani and Yoshihara [19]).
Following Roemer [14], classes can be defined based on the way in which
agents relate to the means of production.6 In every t, for any ξtν ∈ Aν (pt , wt ),
consider only the first three entries of ξtν , and let (a1 , a2 , a3 ) be a vector
where ai ∈ {+, 0}, i = 1, 2, 3, where “+” means a positive entry. Agent ν
is said to be a member of class (a1 , a2 , a3 ), if there is ξtν ∈ Aν (pt , wt ) such
that (xνt ; ytν ; ztν ) has the form (a1 , a2 , a3 ). The notation (+, +, 0) implies, for
instance, that an agent works in her own ‘shop’ and hires others to work
for her; (+, 0, +) implies that an agent works both in her own ‘shop’ and
for others; and so on. Although there are eight conceivable classes, only the
following four are theoretically relevant.
6

Again, observe that we focus on within period classes (see Veneziani [17, 18]).
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Ct1
Ct2
Ct3
Ct4

=
=
=
=

{ν
{ν
{ν
{ν

∈N
∈N
∈N
∈N

| Aν (pt , wt )
| Aν (pt , wt )
| Aν (pt , wt )
| Aν (pt , wt )

has
has
has
has

a
a
a
a

solution
solution
solution
solution

of
of
of
of

the
the
the
the

form
form
form
form

(+, +, 0) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
(+, 0, 0)} ,
(+, 0, +) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
(0, 0, +)} .

The notation (a1 , a2 , a3 )\ (a01 , a02 , a03 ) means that agent ν is a member of class
(a1 , a2 , a3 ) but not of class (a01 , a02 , a03 ).
To see that Ct1 − Ct4 represent a partition of the set of agents, note first
that classes (0, +, 0) and (0, 0, 0) can be ignored without loss of generality:
at a RS with w
bt > b both classes are empty by Lemma 1, while if w
bt = b
(and so πt > 0) then agents in (0, +, 0) and (0, 0, 0) also belong to (0, +, +)
and (0, 0, +), respectively.
Theorem 3 characterises the class structure of the accumulating economy.
Theorem 3: Let (1, w)
b be a RS for E0 . At any t, if πt > 0:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

ν
ν
ν
ν

∈
∈
∈
∈

(+, +, 0)\(+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lytν > ztν for all ξtν ∈ Aν (1, w
bt ) ;
ν
ν
ν
ν
(+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyt = zt for some ξt ∈ A (1, w
bt ) ;
ν
ν
ν
(+, 0, +)\(+, 0, 0) ⇔ Lyt < zt for all ξt ∈ Aν (1, w
bt ) ;
ν
(0, 0, +) ⇔ Wt−1 = 0.

ν
Proof: 1. If πt > 0, then by Lemma 1, for all ν ∈ N , A (xνt + ytν ) = ωt−1
ν
ν
ν
for all ξt ∈ A (1, w
bt ). Therefore ν ∈ (0, 0, +) implies Wt−1 = 0. Conversely,
ν
= 0, then ν ∈ (0, 0, +).
it is easy to see that for all w
bt = b, if Wt−1
ν
2. Consider agents with Wt−1 > 0. By the convexity of M Ptν , if Lytν > ztν
bt ), then there
bt ) and Lyt0ν < zt0ν for some ξt0ν ∈ Aν (1, w
for some ξtν ∈ Aν (1, w
00ν
ν
00ν
00ν
is ξt ∈ A (1, w
bt ) such that Lyt = zt . Therefore, for all agents with
ν
Wt−1
> 0: either Lytν > ztν for all ξtν ∈ Aν (1, w
bt ); or Lytν < ztν for all
bt ). The latter are
bt ); or Lytν = ztν for some ξtν ∈ Aν (1, w
ξtν ∈ Aν (1, w
mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases.
3. Part (i). Suppose Lytν > ztν for all ξtν ∈ Aν (1, w
bt ). We consider two
cases.
Case 1 : w
bt > b. By Lemma 1, at all ξtν ∈ Aν (1, w
bt ), it must be
ν
A (xνt + ytν ) = ωt−1
and Lxνt + ztν = lν . From the first equation it follows that
ν
ν
Lxνt + Lytν = LA−1 ωt−1
and so we have LA−1 ωt−1
− Lytν = lν − ztν . Since
ν
ν
ν
ν
−1 ν
ν
Lyt > zt for all ξt ∈ A (1, w
bt ), then LA ωt−1 > l .
0ν
0ν
0ν
ν
0ν
0ν
ν
ν
Consider ξt = (xt ; yt ; 0; 0) such that Lx0ν
t = l , and xt + yt = xt + yt .
ν
Note that yt0ν = A−1 ωt−1
−L−1 lν > 0 and so noting that zt0ν −Lyt0ν = ztν −Lytν ,
by Lemma 3 it follows that ξt0ν ∈ Aν (1, w
bt ). Hence, ν ∈ (+, +, 0).
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It remains to show that ν ∈
/ (+, 0, 0). Suppose, by way of contradiction,
ν
ν
bt ). Since πt > 0, then by Lemma 1,
that there is ξt = (xt ; 0; 0; 0) ∈ Aν (1, w
ν
ν
> lν , a contradiction.
and so Lxνt = LA−1 ωt−1
Axνt = ωt−1
ν
Case 2 : w
bt = b. In this case, any ξtν such that δtν = 0, A (xνt + ytν ) = ωt−1
,
ν
ν
ν
ν
and Lxt + zt 5 l , solves M Pt . Therefore, it is immediate to see that
ν
ν ∈ (+, +, 0). Further, ξtν = 0; A−1 ωt−1
; lν ; 0 ∈ Aν (1, w
bt ), and therefore
ν
ν
−1 ν
ν
ν
ν
bt ) implies LA ωt−1 > l . Hence the same
Lyt > zt for all ξt ∈ A (1, w
argument as in Case 1 can be used to prove ν ∈
/ (+, 0, 0).
4. Parts (ii) and (iii) are proved similarly.
Theorem 3 provides a complete partition of the set of agents into classes,
based on the way in which agents relate to the means of production. An
immediate implication of Theorem 3 is that the class status of each agent is
related to her productive endowments.
Corollary 1: Let (1, w)
b be a RS for E0 . Consider any t, such that πt > 0.
1
−1 ν
ν
Then, ν ∈ Ct ⇔ LA ωt−1 > lν and ν ∈ Ct4 ⇔ Wt−1
= 0. Furthermore,
ν
ν
< lν ;
= lν and ν ∈ Ct3 ⇔ LA−1 ωt−1
if w
bt > b, then ν ∈ Ct2 ⇔ LA−1 ωt−1
ν
5 lν and Ct3 = ∅.
whereas if w
bt = b, then ν ∈ Ct2 ⇔ LA−1 ωt−1
A fundamental insight of Marxian exploitation theory is the existence
of a tight relation between class positions and exploitation status. This is
formalised in the next principle.7
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP) [Roemer [14]]:
Given any economy E0 , at any RS and any t, if πt > 0:
(A) every member of Ct1 is an exploiter.
(B) every member of Ct3 ∪ Ct4 such that Λνt > 0 is exploited.
The next result proves that the CECP holds in the accumulation economies
considered in this paper.
Theorem 4 (CECP): Let (1, w)
b be a RS for E0 . At any t, such that πt > 0,
if ν ∈ Ct1 then ν is an exploiter and if ν ∈ Ct3 ∪ Ct4 then ν is exploited.
Furthermore, if w
bt > b then:
ν ∈ Ct1 ⇔ ν is an exploiter;
ν ∈ Ct2 ⇔ ν is neither exploited nor an exploiter;
ν ∈ Ct3 ∪ Ct4 ⇔ ν is exploited.
7

In part (B), we impose the condition that agents in the lower classes spend some of
their time working. This is a theoretically appropriate restriction since the exploitation
status of agents who do not engage in any economic activities is unclear.
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Proof: 1. If w
bt > b, then the result follows immediately from Corollary 1
and Theorem 2, noting that by Lemma 1, Λνt = lν and π1t [1−vwbt v] = A
.
L
ν
4
3
2. Suppose that w
bt = b. By Corollary 1, ν ∈ Ct ∪ Ct ⇔ Wt−1 = 0.
Hence by Theorem 2, if Λνt > 0, then ν is exploited. Further, by Corollary
Wν
Wν
ν
> lν . Noting that Λt−1
1, ν ∈ Ct1 ⇔ LA−1 ωt−1
= lt−1
> A
= π1t [1−vwbt v] , the
ν
ν
L
t
result follows from Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 confirms the standard Marxist insight that agents in the upper
classes are exploiters and agents in the lower classes are exploited.

5

An index of exploitation

The relation between class and exploitation status derived in the previous
section provides some interesting normative insights on the structural injustices characterising capitalist economies, as Roemer [14] has forcefully
argued. Yet, an exclusive focus on classes and on the sets of exploiters and
exploited agents, as well as on the CECP, yields a rather partial, coarse picture of the structure of exploitative relations: two economies with similar
numbers of agents belonging to each class and each exploitation category
may still be very different. Based on Definition 2, it is possible to extend the
normative reach of the concept of exploitation and provide a finer and more
comprehensive picture of exploitative relations.
A first important characteristic of Definition 2 is that it allows us to
move beyond a purely aggregate analysis and explore the exploitation status
of every agent. This immediately raises the issue of the measurement of the
intensity of exploitation, both at the individual and at the aggregate level. It
is certainly desirable to have a notion of exploitation that allows us to make
statements such as “agent A is less exploited than agent B”, or “Economy C is
more exploitative than economy D”, or “Economy E is becoming increasingly
exploitative over time”.
Definition 2 states that exploitation status is determined according to
whether Λνt ≷ vcνt . Therefore a natural index of the intensity of exploitation
of any agent ν ∈ Nt in period t is:
eνt =

Λνt
,
vcνt

where eνt ∈ [0, ∞), and eνt can be interpreted as the rate of labour supplied relative to the labour necessary to obtain one unit of consumption.
From this perspective, exploitative relations are equivalent to inequalities in
14

labour hours supplied to earn one unit of income (measured in the labour
numéraire) and the notion of exploitation is normatively relevant in that
eνt can be interpreted as a well-being index capturing access to some fundamental primary goods, namely economic resources (or commodities) and
free hours. The profile (eνt )ν ∈Nt then measures the distribution of access to
resources and free hours and so of opportunity for well-being.
Agent ν is exploited if and only if eνt > 1, but, assuming eνt to be a
meaningful cardinal and interpersonally comparable measure, a much richer
analysis of exploitative relations is possible. For example, one can say that
the greater eνt the more exploited ν is and, for any ν,µ ∈ Nt , if eνt > eµt > 1
then ν is more exploited than µ. And similarly for exploiters. More generally, we can analyse the distribution of eνt in the economy at a given point
in time, as well as its evolution over time, and ask questions about the exploitation structure of the economy. A more polarised distribution of eνt , for
instance, suggests an increase in the intensity of exploitation. Interestingly,
the mathematical structure of the profile (eνt )ν ∈Nt is similar to that of income
or wealth distributions, and so the measurement of some aggregate degree
of exploitation raises similar issues as in the debate on the measurement of
income or wealth inequalities. Below, we provide a complete description of
the (dynamics of the) distribution of eνt . We also trace the evolution of the
associated Gini index, interpreted as one example of a summary measure of
the aggregate intensity of exploitation.

6

The dynamics of the basic model

This section analyses the basic model computationally. The aim is to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results derived above and to rigorously
describe the dynamics of exploitation and class - including the distribution
of the exploitation intensity variable - in the benchmark case. This section
also provides the basic formal and computational framework for the analysis
of more complex economies below.
The simulation begins with data on (N ; (A, L) ; b; Π, Ω0 ). The benchmark
set of parameters is: N = 100, A = 0.5, L = 0.25, b = 1.9, and lν =
1, for all ν ∈ N . As concerns productive assets, aggregate initial capital
is ω0 = 25. This guarantees that l > LA−1 ω0 holds and the economy is
initially capital constrained, starting far from the knife-edge condition l =
LA−1 ωt−1 . This is important in order to examine the existence and evolution
of exploitation, profits and classes over time: by Theorem 1, the knife-edge
condition identifies a ceiling to capital accumulation as it provides an upper
15

bound to the aggregate amount of capital compatible with the existence of
positive profits and exploitation.
The distribution of aggregate capital is determined in order to mimic the
empirical wealth distribution in the U.S. economy as reported by Allegretto
[1]. In all of our simulations, ω0 is distributed such that there are five groups
of agents. The first group comprises 50-70% of the total population and each
ν in this group is assigned ω0ν = 0.8 The top 1% of agents are assigned 40% of
ω0 , the next 4% are assigned 30% of ω0 , the next 15% are assigned 20%, and
the remaining 10% of ω0 is distributed to whatever agents remain (minimum
10% and maximum 30% of N ).
This parameterisation represents our benchmark in all simulations, unless
otherwise stated.9 It is worth stressing at the outset that the values chosen
are empirically reasonable, but - as shown in section 9 below - our key insights
are robust to different choices of the initial values of the key parameters.
Concerning agents, by Lemma 3, we restrict the computational analysis
to solutions of M Ptνfor all ν and t of the form(0; ytν ; ztν ; δtν ). To be specific, at
−1
ν
ν
; LA l ωt−1 lν ; 0 , ξtν = 0; LA−1l ωt−1 A−1 ωt−1
any t, we set ξtν = 0; A−1 ωt−1
; lν ;




ν
ν
1 − LA−1l ωt−1 ωt−1
, or ξtν = 0; A−1 ωt−1
; lν ; 0 , for all ν, depending on
whether the economy is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the
knife-edge. In all of our simulations, this specification of agents’ optimal
choices guarantees that the conditions in Definition 1 are always satisfied.10
The simulation runs for T = 50 periods. The simulation first checks
whether the economy is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the
knife-edge and updates w
bt accordingly. Given the choice of ω0 , the simulation
begins with w
b1 = b. Once w
bt is determined, πt is known and the agents then
ν
solve M Pt . The agent’s endowments are updated according to equation (5)
and the simulation then repeats as necessary.11
The results of the simulation over T can be found in Figures 1-3. Figure
1 reports the aggregate activity levels (xt , yt , zt , δt ), aggregate net output
(1 − A) yt , net output per capita (1 − A) yt /N , wealth Wt−1 , the growth rate
of capital gt , w
bt and b, and πt . In all panels, the dashed vertical line denotes
8

The actual number of agents assigned to this first group is randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution.
9
The procedure to determine the initial wealth distribution is the same in all versions
of the model. While the initial distributions will inevitably differ across models due to
different starting points in relation to the knife-edge and to the randomness built into
the procedure, the differences are sufficiently small that the results of the simulations are
unaffected and can be compared across models.
10
See Section A.1 of the Appendix.
11
All simulations are done using Mathematica version 10.
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the period in which the economy becomes labour constrained.
Figure 2(a) reports the dynamics of exploitation by providing a headcount
of the agents who are exploiters, exploited, or neither according to Definition
2. Clearly, the exploitation status of agents is constant while the economy is
capital constrained and exploitation ceases to exist once it becomes labour
constrained.
Figure 2(b) captures the class composition of the economy. The pattern
of Ct1 and Ct2 is interesting and it reveals the relation between endowments
and class status: at the beginning of the simulation, a relatively low level
of capital implies that for a number of agents labour demand (Lytν ) is lower
than their labour endowment (lν ), placing them into Ct2 . As accumulation
progresses, however, so does their labour demand and these agents eventually
join Ct1 .12
Figure 2(c) illustrates Theorem 4 and shows the existence of robust correspondence between class and exploitation status (until the economy becomes
labour constrained).
Figure 3 provides a complete description of the distribution of the exploitation intensity index, eνt , over the course of the simulation. Prior to the
economy becoming labour constrained, the distribution of eνt is constant over
time: there is no tendency for exploitation to diminish. When the economy
becomes labour constrained, profits and exploitation disappear, and one can
observe that eνt = 1, all ν ∈ N . Interestingly, agents in the lower classes
are exploited to somewhat different degrees. All agents in Ct4 are exploited
with equal intensity, since they all have zero endowments and work the same
amount. The exploitation status of agents in Ct2 is not obvious instead: some
of them are indeed exploited (albeit less than members of Ct4 ) but agents at
the upper end of Ct2 are exploiters (albeit less than members of Ct1 ).
Figure 3 displays a relatively low dispersion of the exploitation index.
This is due to the fact that, unlike in actual economies, all agents perform
the same amount of labour and, in the capital constrained phase, the given
parameterisation (in particular the rather high value of b) yields a low profit
rate. Different values of the parameters, or a heterogeneous allocation of
labour (perhaps inversely proportional to wealth, in order to reflect class
differences) lead to a much higher dispersion (see section 9 below).13
In summary, the results of the basic model confirm that exploitation and
12

In Figure 2(b), and in all similar figures below, the class composition of the economy
is shown only for the periods t with πt > 0. For if the profit rate vanishes Theorem 3 and
Corollary 1 no longer apply, and the definition of classes needs to be revised.
13
The Gini coefficient of (eνt )v∈N is constant and equal to 0.0281395 until the economy
becomes labour constrained, when it drops to zero.
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Figure 1: Summary results - Basic model
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Figure 2: Class and exploitation status - Basic model
(a) Exploitation status

(b) Class status

(c) CECP

classes are meaningful concepts to analyse the economic and social structure
of capitalist economies, and the distribution of exploitation intensity index
yields interesting normative insights. They also confirm, however, that in an
accumulation economy, absent any countervailing forces, exploitation disappears over time. Our next step, therefore, is to extend the basic model in
order to explore possible mechanisms that could lead to the persistence of
exploitation in the presence of accumulation.
In all of the following extensions, we introduce technical change as a key
mechanism for maintaining labour abundant relative to capital. Technical
change plays a prominent role in Marxian theory and it has been central
in debates on the persistence of exploitation (e.g. Skillman [15]). But we
consider two different models to determine the key distributive variables,
19

Figure 3: Exploitation intensity index - Basic model

namely wages and profits. In the next section, we explore the interplay of
technical change and the evolution of social norms, whereas in section 8 we
set up a general bargaining model.

7

Endogenising consumption and technical change

In this section we extend the basic model to allow both the consumption
bundle, bt , and the production technology, (At , Lt ) to be determined endogenously and change over time, and analyse their effect on the dynamics of
exploitation and classes. This choice reflects both empirical and theoretical concerns. Empirically, the long-run evolution of capitalist economies has
indeed been characterised by an increase in (average) consumption opportunities and by a tendential expansion of technical knowledge, leading to a
progressive increase in labour productivity (see Flaschel et al. [7]).
Theoretically, a fundamental feature of capitalism as a dynamic system is
its constant tendency to revolutionise production. It is certainly restrictive
to assume the production technology (A, L) to remain constant over time,
and regardless of changes in prices and distribution. Labour-saving technical progress may also play a crucial role in the dynamics of exploitation
by guaranteeing the persistent abundance of labour. Further, although sub20

jective consumption choices are not central in the Marxian analysis of class
and exploitation, it is restrictive (and unrealistic) to assume that consumption norms remain constant over time with the subsistence wage at some
biologically-determined level.
To be specific, concerning consumption, we incorporate some Marxian insights on the social nature of consumption and assume that bt is the product
of social norms, by making it a function of the general level of development
of the economy, as proxied by aggregate capital, and of the history of consumption itself. Formally,
bt = f1 (bt−1 , ωt−2 , ωt−1 ).
With the specification used in the simulation as follows:


ωt−1 − ωt−2
,
bt = bt−1 · 1 + φ
ωt−2

(6)

where the parameter φ captures the degree to which the degree of development of the economy influences consumption norms.
Concerning technology, we follow Marx and assume that when the profit
rate falls beneath a certain threshold, capitalists increase their efforts to
innovate and introduce new capital-using labour-saving techniques. Formally,
(At , Lt ) = f2 (w
bt ; At−1 , Lt−1 ),
where f2 is defined as follows
1 − At−1 − w
bt Lt−1
= π∗,
At−1
1 − At−1 − w
bt Lt−1
=
< π∗,
At−1

(At , Lt ) = (At−1 , Lt−1 ) , if π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 ) =
(At , Lt ) = (A0 , L0 ) , if π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 )

where π ∗ is the capitalist’s minimum profitability benchmark, which will
depend on economic, institutional and even cultural factors. The new tech0
0
nique (A0 , L0 ) is chosen such that A0 = At−1 , L0 < Lt−1 , and π 0 = 1−A A−0wbt L >
π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 ) . In the simulations, we assume that capitalists decide whether
to introduce new techniques as soon as they know bt and the real wage w
bt and thus π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 ) . This is both theoretically and empirically reasonable,
but it is worth stressing that - as argued in section 9 below - the main results
are robust to alternative assumptions on the timing of innovations.
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7.1

Simulation results

In our simulations, we set π ∗ = 0.01. When π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 ) < π ∗ , the new
technique prevailing at t is identified by first selecting a profit rate, π 0 , from
the set of all previous profit rates {πτ }τ <t , such that πτ > π ∗ and then
randomly choosing an increase in At−1 in the range [0.01, 0.03] and setting
0
tπ
. To ensure that At < 1 a limit is set such that Amax = 0.991.
Lt = 1−Atwb−A
t
In the event that the pseudo-randomly determined π 0 and At entail a negative
Lt , π 0 is adjusted downward by 0.02 so that Lt > 0.
The simulation occurs in the following order: (1) initialisation, t = 1;
(2) subsistence bt is updated; (3) w
bt and π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 ) are determined;14 (4)
(w
bt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 )
given π
, At and Lt are updated if appropriate, leading πt to be
subsequently updated to reflect the new technology; (5) agents solve M Ptν ;
and (6) the sequence (2)-(5) is repeated for T .
The simulation runs for T = 50, with A0 = 0.5, L0 = 1, b0 = 0.3,
φ = 1, ltν = 1 for all ν ∈ Nt and all t, and Nt = 100, all t. The initial
distribution of endowments Ω0 is chosen as in the basic model, with aggregate
initial endowments ω0 = 15, so that l > L1 A−1
1 ω0 and the model is capital
constrained at the start of the simulation.
The main results of the model are depicted in Figures 4-7(b). Figure 4 reports the same information as Figure 1 for the basic model. Some differences
between Figures 1 and 4 clearly emerge, notably concerning the dynamics of
net output, wealth, and labour performed. While net output and wealth grow
over the course of the simulation (as driven by yt ), zt exhibits a cyclical downward trend. This is caused by the decreasing trend of Lt together with its
cyclical movements driven by the periods of accumulation and rising labour
demand occurring between (labour-saving) technological changes. Throughout the cycles of accumulation and technical change the economy remains
capital constrained. Therefore there is a secular increase in w
bt = bt from
b0 = 0.3 to bmax = 92.6886, and, as expected, πt exhibits cyclical behaviour
in the range of its initial value π0 = 0.4 and a minimum of πmin = 0.0100257
(see Figure 4). Figure 5 shows the dynamics of At , Lt , and labour values.15
The interaction among consumption behaviour, social norms and capitalist innovations leads to a very interesting dynamic behaviour. As predicted,
technical change allows exploitation and classes to persist. The intuition
14

The determination of the wage rate and profit rate depends on whether the economy
is capital constrained, labour constrained, or on the knife-edge. If the economy is capital
constrained we set w
bt = bt .
15
The condition vt bt < 1 holds throughout the simulation even as (vt , bt ) change over
T.
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Figure 4: Summary results - Model with endogenous subsistence and technical change
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Figure 5: Technology and labour values - Model with endogenous subsistence
and technical change

is the following. Since the economy is initially capital constrained, then
w
bt = bt for at least some periods t, t ≥ 1. As accumulation proceeds, the
subsistence norm, bt , increases and so does the real wage rate in equilibrium. Therefore the profit rate starts declining before the economy becomes
labour constrained. But as the profit rate goes beneath π ∗ , an innovation is
introduced which restores profitability, and so on. It is noteworthy that a
strongly cyclical behaviour is generated in an essentially linear economy: it
is the interaction of technical change and capitalist behaviour that generates
persistent growth cycles.
Figures 6(a)-6(b) show the remarkable persistence and stability of the
basic exploitation and class structure of the economy produced by the introduction of technical change.16 Figure 6(c) confirms that the CECP continues
to hold in the more general economy considered here.
Figures 6(a)-6(c) focus on the basic exploitation and class structure of
the economy, as in the standard Marxian approach, and thus draw a partial
picture of exploitative relations. To see this, consider Figures 7(a)-7(b) which
provide information about the distribution of the exploitation intensity in16

The “bumps” in the number of agents in Ct1 and Ct2 in Figure 6(b) are due to decreases
in Lt yielding Lt ytν ≤ lν for some ν who were previously members of Ct1 .
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Figure 6: Class and exploitation status - Model with endogenous subsistence
and technical change
(a) Exploitation status

(b) Class status

(c) CECP

dex eνt . Under the surface of a seemingly unchanging pattern of exploitation,
Figures 7(a)-7(b) show that the addition of technical change induces an interesting phenomenon of “exploitation cycles”. As accumulation progresses
with a given technique (At , Lt ), exploitation tends to decrease as eνt tends to
1 for all ν. However, when a new technique is introduced, profitability and
inequality in exploitation intensity are restored, driving a wedge between the
lower and upper classes, and the pattern of accumulation and exploitation
resumes until another production technique is introduced.
The results support the claim that capital-using labour-saving technical
change can help to explain the persistence of exploitation in accumulation
economies (Skillman [15]). The key role of technical change in this context is
25

Figure 7: Exploitation intensity index - Model with endogenous subsistence
and technical change
(a) Exploitation intensity across agents

(b) Gini coefficient of eνt

to make capital persistently scarce relative to labour and to maintain labour
unemployment throughout. This is certainly an important insight but it is
worth stressing that it derives from a rather specific mechanism to determine distributive variables: technical change plays a crucial role in creating
labour unemployment which in turn forces the real wage down to the (socially determined and time-evolving) subsistence level. This immediately
raises two issues. First, it appears that labour unemployment is a necessary determinant of the persistence of exploitative relations. Yet it would
be important, both normatively and theoretically, to analyse exploitation
and class in economies with full employment. Nothing in Marx’s theory of
exploitation and class depends on the existence of unemployment and full
employment does not make capitalist economies non-exploitative. Second,
given the extremely skewed asset distribution, the assumption of a perfectly
competitive labour market seems rather unrealistic. With the richest 5% of
the population holding around 70% of the wealth and employing a mass
of propertyless agents (around 50-70% of the population), and the issues of
power and class solidarity that this polarised wealth distribution raises, it
seems natural to analyse a more complex model for the determination of the
key distributive variables.
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In the next section, we extend our analysis to explore the interplay of
accumulation and technical change in more general economies with full employment, generalised Nash bargaining, and population growth.

8

Endogenous technical change with collective bargaining on wages and profits

In this section, we analyse exploitation and class in capitalist economies
with technical change and population growth, by focusing on dynamic paths
characterised by the full employment of labour. The key point to note is
that whenever the economy is at the knife-edge, with Lt A−1
t ωt−1 = lt , the
equilibrium distribution is generally indeterminate. This allows us to explore
the effects of bargaining on exploitation and class.

8.1

The bargaining model

Consider any period t such that Lt A−1
t ωt−1 = lt . For given technology and
population, we assume that income distribution is determined by collective
bargaining at the beginning of t, before the production process starts. To be
specific, given pt = 1, the bargaining game S (At , Lt ) is defined as17


ν
; (1, w
bt ) (∀ν ∈ Nt ) ,
S (At , Lt ) ≡ ∪wb ∈hb, 1 i (sν )ν∈Nt | sν 5 Vtν ωt−1
t

vt


ν
ν
where Vtν ωt−1
; (1, w
bt ) = (1 + πt ) ωt−1
+ (w
bt − b) ltν , all ν ∈ Nt , and so the
set of Pareto-optimal payoffs
identified by varying w
bt . Let
P is completely
ν
t
=
1
denote
a
profile
of
weights
capturing
σt ≡ (σtν )ν∈Nt ∈ RN
with
σ
+
ν∈Nt t
the agents’ bargaining power. The Nash bargaining solution N (σt ) (S (At , Lt ))
is:
σν
 ν ν
Q
bt ) t .
ωt−1 ; (1, w
N (σt ) (S (At , Lt )) = arg max
i
h
ν∈Nt Vt
w
bt ∈ b, v1

t

There are many conceivable ways of capturing agents’ bargaining power.
Different specifications yield different dynamics of income distributions and
exploitative relations. In what follows, we consider a large set of possibilities
by specifying the bargaining power of each agent ν ∈ Nt as follows:
σtν ≡ (1 − )
17

ν
ωt−1
Nν
+  t , some  ∈ [0, 1] ,
ωt−1
Nt

(7)

In this section, we focus on the bargaining procedure and assume again a constant b.
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where Ntν ≥ 1 is the
agents who possess the same wealth as ν.
 0 number of
ν
ν0
ν
.
Formally, Nt ≡ # ν ∈ Nt | ωt−1 = ωt−1
Equation (7) incorporates some important insights of Marxian theory.
For it states that the bargaining power of each agent ν ∈ Nt depends partly
on the ownership of means of production (more precisely, on their share of
aggregate capital) and partly on the number of agents who share the same
objective condition as ν (in terms of capital ownership). Thus, bargaining
power derives either from economic resources, or from the ability of agents
in a similar condition to act collectively.
Equation (7) is very general. The variable  allows us to capture the
polar cases of economies with weak solidarity and low levels of organisation
( ≈ 0), and economies in which the power of capital and economic resources
is mitigated by collective action ( ≈ 1), as well as any intermediate scenarios.
If  = 0, then the bargaining power of each agent is proportional to her
share of aggregate capital: capitalists have all the bargaining power while
propertyless agents have no influence at all on the determination of wages
and profits. In contrast, if  = 1, then - given a very skewed distribution of
wealth - the richer segments of the population have virtually no bargaining
power: propertyless agents constitute the majority of population and play
the main role in determining bargaining outcomes.
(σ )
Let w
btN t ∈ N (σt ) (S (At , 
Lt )): in period
t, every agent ν ∈ Nt solves

(σ
)
t
btN
, and given ((At , Lt ) , b). Because
M Ptν given the price vector 1, w
Lt A−1
t ωt−1 = lt , it is immediate to show that conditions (a)-(d) of Definition
1 are satisfied.
At the end of the period, both technological knowledge and population
(σ )

1−A −w
bN

(σt )

L

t
t
t
are updated. Concerning the former, let πtN t =
be the profit
At
(σ )
rate resulting from the bargaining process. As in section 7, if πtN t < π ∗ ,
then capitalists redouble their efforts to find new profitable techniques. We
assume that in this case a new technique is generated with probability λ 5 1,
such that At+1 = gAt and Lt+1 = gLt , for some g < 1. The new technique is
obviously cost reducing and therefore is universally adopted in period t + 1.
Concerning population, we assume that economic growth drives population growth - for example, by determining population flows in or out of the
economy, or as part of a general Malthusian mechanism. Formally, in each
t, if the economy is at a knife-edge equilibrium, then population in period
t + 1, lt+1 , will be


lt+1 = (1 − bLt ) A−1
lt ,
t


where (1 − bLt ) A−1
corresponds to the growth rate of capital at t and
t
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can be interpreted, in a classical-Marxian fashion, as the natural rate of
population growth. For it is reasonable to assume that in a situation of full
utilisation of capital and labour, the growth rate of population is adjusted
to be equal to the rate of capital accumulation.18
The combined effect of our assumptions on technical change and population growth is that if the economy is at a full employment equilibrium in
period t, there will be neither excess capital nor excess labour in t + 1. To
be sure, both assumptions can be deemed somewhat artificial: they should
be interpreted as a schematic representation (due to the linear structure of
the model and the peculiarity of the knife-edge condition) of a self-correcting
mechanism, or as part of a balanced growth path.

8.2

Simulation Results

The simulation begins with the same N0 = 100 and the same distribution
of wealth as in all previous models, and with initial values of A0 = 0.9,
L0 = 1, and b = 0.08. For the technical change routine the threshold profit
rate is π ∗ = 0.03 and the likelihood of discovering a new technique when
appropriate is λ = 1. When technical change takes place, the value of g is
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution from 0.9 to 0.96. As concerns
the bargaining parameter  in equation (7), below we consider three different
scenarios, namely the two polar cases with capitalist dominance ( = 0) and
class solidarity ( = 1), and the intermediate case with  ∈ (0, 1) .
The simulation occurs in the following order: (1) determine (σtν )ν∈Nt ; (2)
N (σ ν )
determine w
bt t and πt through Nash bargaining; (3) agents solve M Ptν ; (4)
population lt+1 is determined to balance the knife-edge condition;19 (5) At+1
and Lt+1 are updated if appropriate; (6) steps (2)-(5) are repeated for T .
18

In a more general setting allowing for unemployment of labour or capital, one could

assume that if the economy is capital constrained at t, then lt+1 < (1 − bLt ) A−1
lt ;
t


−1
while if the economy is labour constrained then lt+1 > (1 − bLt ) At lt . This is because
if the economy is capital constrained and labour is abundant then the wage rate is at the
subsistence level and, in the Malthusian law of population, labour supply grows slowly,
while if the economy is labour constrained and capital is abundant, profits are zero and
the real wage is very high, inducing a high growth rate of the population.
19
In order to ensure that lt = Lt A−1
t ωt−1 holds for all t, Nt is determined by rounding
−1
Lt At ωt−1 up to the nearest integer. Therefore ωt−1 is also adjusted upward to maintain
the knife-edge. Any additional capital is added to the endowment of the wealthiest agent
in order to avoid random changes in the behaviour of the simulation. Any new agents
ν
enter the simulation with ωt−1
= 0. This is reasonable as a first approximation, or if one
interprets population growth mainly as the product of migration flows.
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8.2.1

Capitalist dominance

Consider first the case where economic resources, and specifically ownership
of the means of production, are the key determinant of bargaining power
and  = 0 in equation (7). Figure 8 reports the summary results of the
aggregate activity levels (yt , xt , zt , δt ), net output (1 − At )yt , net output per
capita (1 − At )yt /Nt , wealth Wt−1
 , the growth rate of capital gt , and the
N (σtν )
distributive variables w
bt
, πt . Two features immediately stand out.
First, the combination of population growth and wage bargaining leads to
rapid accumulation. Even over a relatively short length of time T = 50,
population grows from 100 agents to 32,485. Second, the bargaining power
of capitalists is such as to guarantee that the profit rate remains positive and
N (σ ν )
at a rather high level, while w
bt t = b for all t, even though the economy
never becomes capital constrained. Figure 9 displays At , Lt , and vt .
Figures 10-11(b) show the exploitation and class status of agents.20 They
show a distinct, remarkable pattern of increasing polarisation in the economy.
As time goes by, an ever increasing proportion of the agents are exploited by
an ever decreasing minority of exploiters. The fraction of agents in the lower
classes constantly rises while that of agents in the upper classes falls.
One interesting result from this simulation is that the Gini coefficient
of eνt decreases over time. This is not because exploitation is disappearing
from the economy, it is an artifact of the way in which Gini coefficients
ν
are constructed. The ever-increasing number of agents with ωt−1
= 0 leads
to the vast majority of agents having identical, high values of eνt , which
leads the Gini of eνt to decrease as shown in Figure 11(a). Given the clear
pattern of increasing polarisation emerging from Figure 10, this suggests that
perhaps the Gini coefficient is not the best index of the aggregate degree of
exploitation, and it raises the issue of the appropriate aggregate measure of
exploitative relations.21
20

Unlike in previous models, given the rapidly changing population over time, in this
section the charts reporting class and exploitation status show the percentage of the population at all t belonging to a given class or exploitation classification.
21
The polarisation of the economy also shows up if one considers the distributions of
wealth and income (taking income as the gross revenue of agents as determined by the
left-hand side of constraint (1) in M Ptν ), whose Gini coefficients monotonically increase
over time, tending to a value above 0.9 in the long run. See section A.4 of the Appendix.
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Figure 8: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 0
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Figure 9: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 0

8.2.2

Class solidarity

Consider next the case where bargaining power is determined solely by class
solidarity and  = 1 in equation (7). The results are presented in Figures
12 and 13. The economy displays a rather fast pace of accumulation as in
the model with capitalist dominance. Given the numerical preponderance
ν
of the agents with ωt−1
= 0, however, the power of class solidarity in wage
N (σ ν )
bargaining favours propertyless agents who set a value of w
bt t leading to
πt = 0 for all t ≥ 1. In other words, working class solidarity eliminates
exploitation from the very beginning and the benefits of accumulation (and
productivity increases) are distributed in the form of increased wages. The
figures reporting exploitation status, class status, and the CECP are not
shown as they do not convey much information. The Gini of the exploitation
intensity index is obviously equal to zero throughout the simulation.22
22

The Gini coefficients of wealth and income display an interesting behaviour over time
and provide a rather different picture of the economy, compared to the Gini coefficient
of (eνt )ν∈Nt . The Gini coefficient of wealth initially decreases, reflecting the reduction in
inequalities due to the zero profit rate and the accumulation of wealth by all agents (since
w
bt > b all t). This trend is then reversed as growth accelerates and the number of new,
propertyless agents added to economy in each t grows closer to (and eventually surpasses)
the number of existing agents with a positive (and possibly quite large) amount of wealth
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Figure 10: Class and exploitation status - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Exploitation status

(b) Class status

(c) CECP

8.2.3

Mixed scenarios

In this section, we consider economies in which  ∈ (0, 1) and the bargaining
power of agents derives both from the ownership of the means of production
and from class solidarity and collective action. The fundamental, and rather
striking result of the computational analysis is that class solidarity plays a
dominant role in the bargaining process and tends to drive the dynamics of
the economy. For instance, for any  ≥ 0.5, the economy behaves in a manner
accumulated over time. In contrast, the Gini coefficient of income (defined as the agents’
gross revenue) exhibits a persistent downward trend during the simulation. This is due
to the fact that by construction the wage income of all agents is the same and the zero
profit rate implies that asset inequalities only partly translate into income inequalities.
(See section A.4 of the Appendix.)
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Figure 11: Information on eνt - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Gini coefficient of eνt

(b) Distribution of eνt for select t (relative frequency)

qualitatively similar to the model with  = 1: the bargaining process leads
N (σ ν )
to a value of w
bt t such that πt = 0 for all t.
Only very small values of  - in the range of 0.001 to 0.005 - allow for
N (σ ν )
behaviour along the knife-edge at which πt > 0 and w
bt t > b, but only for a
small number of periods. For  ∈ [0.001, 0.005], the economy displays a very
interesting cyclical behaviour: the bargaining power of propertyless agents
drives profits initially to zero but, once technical change occurs, the profit
rate starts to increase, and accumulation with it. However, as population
also grows, the number of new (propertyless) agents added in every t is large
and their class solidarity begins to outweigh the power of relatively wealthy
agents. This leads the profit rate to decrease and even though - when πt falls
below π ∗ - other technical innovations are introduced, they only allow for a
short-lived recovery of profitability. The economy then enters a phase during
which profits and exploitation disappear for any remaining t.
Below, we show the results of the simulation for  = 0.002. Figure 14
reports the summary results of the aggregate activity levels (yt , xt , zt , δt ),
net output (1 − At )yt , net output per capita (1 − At )yt /Nt , wealth Wt−1 ,
34

Figure 12: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 1
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Figure 13: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 1



N (σ ν )
the growth rate of capital gt , and the distributive variables w
bt t , πt .
As in the previous cases, the combination of population growth and wage
bargaining leads to rapid accumulation. Even over a short length of time
T = 20, the population grows from 100 agents to 8,556. The bottom right
panel captures the cycle in the profit rate described above, where πt = 0 for
all t ≥ 15. Figure 15 displays At , Lt , and vt .23
Figures 16(a)-16(c) show the exploitation and class status of agents. Figure 16(a) captures the lack of exploitation at the start of the simulation,
its reemergence for a period of time, and its eventual disappearance. Figure 16(b) reports the dynamics of classes, which is richer than in previous
models. Observe that, whenever the real wage is above the subsistence level,
2
4
all agents in Ct4 accumulate and join Ct+1
, and are fully replaced in Ct+1
by the newly arrived agents with ωtν = 0. Hence, the economy shows some
upward mobility. As accumulation progresses, wage bargaining mediates the
movement of some agents between Ct1 and Ct2 , but the continued expansion
of Ct4 and the faster pace of accumulation induce a downward trend in the
size of Ct2 and an upward trend in that of Ct1 . The continual growth of Ct4
(despite upward social mobility) reflects the arrival of an increasingly larger
number of propertyless agents. Figure 16(c) captures the short period of
23

The condition vt bt < 1 holds throughout the simulation.
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Figure 14: Summary results - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
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Figure 15: Technology and labour values - Bargaining model with  = 0.002

time for which capitalists are able to convert their ownership of the means of
production into economic advantage and the CECP applies, after which the
correspondence between class and exploitation status breaks down.
Figures 17(a) shows the Gini coefficient for eνt , which mirrors the cycle
in the profit rate with exploitation intensity eventually converging to one for
all agents once πt = 0. Snapshots of the distribution of eνt for select t are
provided in Figure 17(b) to show the progression of exploitation intensity to
uniformity as accumulation progresses.24
In closing this section, some interesting features of the economies with
bargaining are worth noting. A comparison of the dynamic paths of the
three models suggests that the class solidarity regime is best and the capitalist dominance regime is worst in terms of several indicators, including
growth rates, capital accumulation, labour productivity, and per capita consumption.25 Of course, this may depend on the exact specification of our
24

The interaction between varying distributional patterns and the changing composition
of the population over time leads to patterns of the Gini coefficients for wealth and income
(defined as gross revenue) that are on the whole qualitatively similar to those of the model
with class solidarity. (See section A.4 of the Appendix.) The basic intuition is the same
as explained in footnote 22.
25
Even population growth is lowest in the capitalist dominance regime and highest in
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Figure 16: Class and exploitation status - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
(a) Exploitation status

(b) Class status

(c) CECP

model, including the assumptions guaranteeing that the economy remains
along the knife-edge path. Yet, this insight is fundamentally consistent with
the fact that capitalist economies with strong concentration of power in the
hands of capitalists tend to settle on dynamic paths with high profit rates
and low growth rates (at least relative to their potential), as forcefully shown
by Piketty [12]. Indeed, in terms of our model, the trajectory of advanced
capitalist economies in the last forty years (the neo-liberal era) might be explained as the product of a shift from a kind of mixed regime with a strong
working class to a capitalist dominance regime.
the class solidarity regime, thus suggesting that the latter would be the most flourishing
society.
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Figure 17: Information on eνt - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
(a) Gini coefficient of eνt

(b) Distribution of eνt for select t (relative frequency)

9

Robustness

We have analysed many variations of our models in order to assess the robustness of our results. In this section, we briefly summarise the main points.26
First, we have considered alternative specifications of the initial values of
the key parameters of all models. Different values of the initial population,
N0 , technology, (A0 , L0 ), consumption bundle, b0 , and aggregate capital, ω0 ,
make hardly any difference to our conclusions.27 Different distributions of
the initial aggregate capital, ω0 , also have no impact on the results, provided
capital is unequally distributed and there are some propertyless agents.
Changes in these parameters may affect the quantitative features of the
economies (e.g., the size of the various classes, the period in which the economy becomes labour constrained, and so on) but the qualitative patterns of
26

Results are available from the authors upon request.
Subject, obviously, to the economy remaining capital constrained or on the knife edge,
depending on the model.
27
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class and exploitation status, as well as the basic summary results, remain
essentially unchanged. It is worth noting, however, that different values of
the initial parameters yield different distributions of eνt . For example, a simulation of the basic economy with the same population and asset distribution
as in section 3, and (A = 0.5, L = 0.25, b = 0.5) yields a distribution of eνt in
the range [0.03306, 4] with a Gini coefficient of 0.26568 - quite close to the
Gini coefficient of income in actual capitalist economies.
Second, we have analysed the robustness of the main results on class structure and on the relation between exploitation and class status by adopting
an alternative definition of classes. Corollary 1 proves that class status is
determined for each agent by the difference between actual labour demand
and potential labour supply - i.e., the agent’s labour endowment. Yet one
may argue that class status should be determined based on agents’ actual
position in the labour market, and so on their actual labour supply. All of
our main insights continue to hold if this alternative approach is adopted.28
Third, the results of the model with technical change and growth in consumption in section 7 are also strongly robust to alternative specifications of
the functions f1 and f2 , including different values of the dampening parameter φ and of the reference profit rate π ∗ , as well as to different assumptions
on the properties of new techniques. Among other tests, we have analysed an
alternative specification of the model in which the new technique (A0 , L0 ) is
chosen by first randomly selecting a change in At from a uniform distribution
between 0.03 and 0.05. Then the new value of Lt is determined by setting
vt bt = v1 b1 + h, where bt is given by equation (6) and h is a random real
number in the interval [−0.25, 0.25].29 To ensure that At < 1 for all t there
is a maximum value set at Amax = 0.991: once Amax is reached, technical
change continues as Harrod-neutral (constant Amax and decreasing Lt when
πt < π ∗ ) to ensure that 1 > vt bt . An interesting property of this model is that
- unlike in section 7 - innovations do not automatically restore profitability.
The results obtained are strikingly similar to those presented in section 7.30
We have also tested alternative assumptions on the timing of technical
change by supposing that the decision to implement technical change is taken
based on realised rather than anticipated profit rates. Formally, this implies
assuming that, when πt < π ∗ , innovations occur after production takes place.
The main insights in section 7 remain valid with classes and exploitation behaving in a qualitatively similar way. Technical change does yield persistent
28

See Section A.3 of the Appendix.
These assumption ensure that the condition, 1 > vt bt , is never violated.
30
See Section A.2 of the Appendix.

29
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exploitation and profits on the whole, but since it occurs ex post the profit
rate is not necessarily strictly positive in every period.
Fourth, section 8 already reports the results for a large set of values of the
bargaining parameter . But the key insights are robust to changes in various
other features of the model. For example, the main results remain essentially
unchanged if we relax the assumption that the likelihood of discovering a new
technique when appropriate is exactly equal to one, or if we allow technical
change to take place at a faster pace by increasing the range of g. Perhaps
more interestingly, in equation (7), instead of defining Ntν as the number of
agents who possess exactly the same amount of wealth as ν, one may adopt
a broader categorisation and define Ntν as the number of agents with wealth
within a certain interval,31 or who belong to the same class as ν.32 These
alternative specifications do not change the results significantly given the
rather unequal wealth distribution, and given our specification of population
growth. For in all of these scenarios the bargaining power of the poorest
segments of the working class remains unchanged, and it increases over time
as more propertyless agents appear in the economy.

10

Conclusions

This paper analyses the equilibrium dynamics of exploitation and class in
general accumulation economies with population growth, technical change,
and bargaining by adopting a novel computational approach. Two sets of
results emerge from the analysis. First, in capitalist economies characterised
by a drive to accumulate, labour-saving technical change plays a key role in
guaranteeing the persistence of exploitation and class by making labour persistently abundant relative to capital. Nonetheless, and perhaps strikingly,
in competitive economies characterised by full employment and bargaining
over distribution, labour-saving technical change and population growth are
not sufficient to generate persistent class and exploitative relations even if
the economy never becomes labour constrained. The model forcefully highlights the importance of power, and specifically bargaining power, as one of
the possible determinants of the persistence of classes and exploitation. It is
only when economic resources, and specifically the ownership of the means of
production, give a significant advantage in distributive conflict - compared to
31
Formally, in any t, let ωtmax = maxν∈Nt ωtν and let {α0 , ..., αn } be a set of real numbers
such that α0 = 0, αn = 1, and αi−1 < αi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then let I0 = 0 and Ii =
(αi−1 ωtmax , αi ωtmax ] for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If ωtν ∈ Ii , i ≥ 0, then Ntν ≡ # {ν 0 ∈ Nt | ν 0 ∈ Ii }.
32
Formally, if ν ∈ Cti , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, Ntν ≡ # ν 0 ∈ Nt | ν 0 ∈ Cti .
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class solidarity among propertyless agents - that exploitative relations persist
over time as an equilibrium feature of capitalist economies.
Second, far from being metaphysical, the concept of exploitation provides
the foundations for a logically coherent and empirically relevant analysis of
inequalities and class relations in advanced capitalist economies. An index
that identifies the exploitation level, or intensity of each individual can be
defined and its empirical distribution studied using the standard tools of the
theory of inequality measurement. In our analysis, we have focused on the
Gini coefficient for illustrative purposes as it is one of the most widely used
indices of dispersion, but - as our simulations show - the Gini coefficient does
not necessarily convey clear normative information about the distribution of
the exploitation index. An interesting open question concerns precisely the
appropriate aggregate index of the intensity of exploitation.33
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to economies with n goods,
more general technologies, and even more complex bargaining procedures. A
particularly intriguing question, for example, concerns the relation between
power and technical change, and their joint relevance for class and exploitation. For the use of economic resources in distributive conflict is only one
dimension of capitalist power. Control over the means of production implies
that capitalists can also determine - at least to some extent - the direction and
nature of technical change. In line with the recent literature on power-biased
technical change (e.g., Guy and Skott [9, 10]), one could analyse innovations
that allow capitalists - either directly or indirectly via changes in the structure of production - to alter power relations, for example, by affecting class
solidarity and increasing the relative weight of economic resources, .34
Another important question concerns the implications of heterogeneity in
labour skills and in individual consumption/leisure trade-offs. On the one
hand, as already noted, the assumption that agents have the same skills and
preferences, and perform the same amount of labour leads to less extreme
inequalities in exploitation intensity than are observed in empirical income
or wealth distributions. We interpret our results as identifying a lower bound
to the intensity of exploitative relations, and as such we think that the distributions obtained in our models are quite remarkable. But it would be
interesting to analyse the distributions emerging when this constraint is relaxed.
33

The answer to this question depends on the normative insights that the notion exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour is meant to capture. We analyse this issue
in [22].
34
Or, perhaps more subtly, using a divide-and-conquer strategy that changes the relevant
ν
Nt for propertyless workers.
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On the other hand, as is well known, the introduction of heterogeneous
labour poses major problems in the standard definition of labour embodied
vt . In this respect, it is important to stress that if the approach developed
in Veneziani and Yoshihara [19, 21] is adopted, then the definition of the
exploitation intensity index can be extended to economies with n goods,
general technologies, and heterogeneous labour, preferences and skills, and
exploitative relations can be analysed empirically based on available data.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider more sophisticated norms in
consumption behaviour, possibly introducing some (class-based) heterogeneity across agents. In our model, an increase in profits - and therefore exploitation - tends to raise the rate of accumulation. As already noted, however,
Piketty [12] has shown that advanced capitalist economies are witnessing
increases in profits (and the profit share) and in inequalities with a comparatively low rate of growth. The computational results in section 8 suggest
that this may be the product of a structural change from a regime with a
strong working class to one of capitalist dominance. Yet observed changes in
consumption habits may also have played an important role. In particular, a
norm of conspicuous consumption for the richest segments of society would
imply that increases in profits are not necessarily translated into a higher rate
of accumulation. Within our computational framework, this phenomenon
could be captured by assuming individual, rather than average, consumption
ν
), with f increasing and possibly convex.
to depend on wealth: bνt = f (ωt−1
Although it does not provide answers to these questions, this paper provides a conceptual and analytical framework to tackle them.
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Appendix A
A.1

Equilibrium conditions

The Figures in this section show that, in all of our simulations, conditions
(b)-(d) of Definition 1 in the paper are satisfied, and so we are analysing the
equilibrium dynamics of the economies considered.
Figure 18: Equilibrium conditions - Basic model

Figure 19: Equilibrium conditions - Model with endogenous subsistence and
technical change
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Figure 20: Equilibrium conditions - Bargaining model with  = 0

Figure 21: Equilibrium conditions - Bargaining model with  = 1

Figure 22: Equilibrium conditions - Bargaining model with  = 0.002
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A.2

An alternative analysis of technical change

In this section, we analyse a variant of the model in section 7 of the paper
in which technical change is modelled in a slightly different way.
We assume that, as soon as capitalists realise that π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 ) < π ∗ , a
new technique (A0 , L0 ) is chosen by first randomly selecting a change in At
from a uniform distribution between 0.03 and 0.05. Then the new value of
Lt is determined by setting vt bt = v1 b1 + h, where bt is given by equation
(6) in the paper and h is a random real number in the interval [−0.25, 0.25].
This ensures that the condition 1 > vt bt is never violated and it helps new
techniques “restore profitability” without imposing it by fiat. To ensure that
At < 1 for all t there is a maximum value set at Amax = 0.991. Once Amax
is reached, technical change continues as Harrod-neutral (constant Amax and
decreasing Lt when π (wbt ;At−1 ,Lt−1 ) < π ∗ ) to ensure that 1 > vt bt , but this
phase is only run for a short time in order to focus on the Marx-biased phase
of technical change.
All parameters, initial conditions and the sequencing of the simulation
routine are identical to the model in section 7.1 of the paper, except for the
length of time T , which is set to 150.
The results of this model are strikingly similar to those reported in section
7.1 of the paper. Figure 23 shows the dynamics of the main variables of the
model. The period in which At = Amax = 0.991 is denoted by a vertical
dashed line. It is worth noting in passing that although zt and πt seem to
vanish in the long-run, neither actually reaches zero: the minimum values
of zt and πt are, respectively, 0.161723 and 0.00145133. Observe further
that Figure 23 displays growth cycles deriving from the interaction of capital
accumulation and technical change. The fluctuations become increasingly
violent and ultimately the economy settles on a course with very low net
output and labour supply due to the increases in productivity. Figure 24
shows the evolution of At , Lt , and vt .
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Figure 23: Summary results

50

Figure 24: Technology and labour values

Figure 25(a) shows that the basic structure of exploitative relations is
identical to that in section 7.1. The class structure of the economy, instead is
slightly different: as shown in Figures 25(b) and 25(c), the number of agents
in the top classes decreases over time and eventually goes to zero. This
interesting result is the product of rapid technical change, which leads Lt to
decrease faster than capital accumulation, yielding a progressive decrease in
labour demand.
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Figure 25: Class and exploitation status
(a) Exploitation status

(b) Class status

(c) CECP

Figures 26(a) and 26(b) depict similar “exploitation cycles” as in section 7.1, which are induced by the interaction of accumulation and technical
change.
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Figure 26: Exploitation intensity index
(b) Gini coefficient of eνt

(a) Exploitation intensity index across agents

A.3

An alternative representation of class

In the paper, we follow Roemer [14] and define the main classes as follows:
Ct1
Ct2
Ct3
Ct4

= {ν
= {ν
= {ν
= {ν

∈N
∈N
∈N
∈N

| Aν (pt , wt )
| Aν (pt , wt )
| Aν (pt , wt )
| Aν (pt , wt )

has
has
has
has

a
a
a
a

solution
solution
solution
solution

of
of
of
of

the
the
the
the

form
form
form
form

(+, +, 0) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
(+, 0, 0)} ,
(+, 0, +) \ (+, 0, 0)} ,
(0, 0, +)} .

In Corollary 1, we prove that at all equilibria with πt > 0, the class status
of an agent is determined by the difference between labour demand and
potential labour supply, which coincides with the agent’s labour endowment.
Yet, one may argue that classes should be defined based on agents’ actual
choices, and in particular on their choices within labour relations. Therefore
in this section we analyse the class structure and the relation between class
and exploitation status in all of our models based on agent’s actual choices.
The results are remarkably similar to those obtained in the paper.
For the basic model:
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Figure 27: Class status (alternative definition) - Basic model
(a) Class status

(b) CECP

For the model with endogenous subsistence and technical change:
Figure 28: Class status (alternative definition) - Model with endogenous
subsistence and technical change
(b) CECP

(a) Class status

For the model with wage bargaining and ε = 0:
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Figure 29: Class status (alternative definition) - Bargaining model with  = 0
(a) Class status

(b) CECP

For the model with wage bargaining and ε = 1:
Figure 30: Class status (alternative definition) - Bargaining model with  = 1
(a) Class status

(b) CECP

For the model with wage bargaining and ε = 0.002:
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Figure 31: Class status (alternative definition) - Bargaining model with  =
0.002
(a) Class status

A.4

(b) CECP

Gini coefficients of wealth and income

In section 8 of the paper, we refer to the behaviour of Gini coefficients for
wealth and income (defined as the gross revenue of each agent, corresponding
to the left hand side of constraint (1) of M Ptν ) over the course the simulations.
The Figures below depict the evolution of these Gini coefficients.
For the model with wage bargaining and  = 0:
Figure 32: Gini coefficients of wealth and income - Bargaining model with
=0
(b) Gini coefficient of income

(a) Gini coefficient of ωt−1

For the model with wage bargaining and  = 1:
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Figure 33: Gini coefficients of wealth and income - Bargaining model with
=1
(b) Gini coefficient of income

(a) Gini coefficient of ωt−1

For the model with wage bargaining and  = 0.002:
Figure 34: Gini coefficients of wealth and income - Bargaining model with
 = 0.002
(a) Gini coefficient of ωt−1

(b) Gini coefficient of income
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